The term Vatsonga is used, as opposed to Xitsonga (which is used in the main judgment in Mayelane), on the basis of the explanation given by Justice Zondo at para 92 note 78 (of the judgment).
10
Also see Allott Limits of Law 10-11, "the recipients of Law … are the all-important people in legal communication".
11
The case in the High Court is reported as MM v MN 2010 4 SA 286 (GNP) . S 7(6) of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 (the Act), which regulates the proprietary consequences of further marriages, provides: "A husband in a customary marriage who wishes to enter into a further customary marriage with another woman after the commencement of this Act must make an application to the court to approve a written contract which will regulate the future matrimonial property system of his marriages." Act. 13 In both the High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal, the issue of the first wife's consent was not addressed. 14 Instead, both courts decided the matter on their respective, but opposing, interpretations of section 7(6) of the Act. 15 In an incisive about-turn, the Constitutional Court adopts a different approach and asks, first, whether the Supreme Court of Appeal should have determined the "consent issue", and second, whether the consent of the first wife is necessary for the validity of a subsequent marriage. 16 The Court is of the opinion that the second question raises a constitutional matter and is an "important and pressing issue" 17 because it "implicates the courts [sic] powers and obligations both to apply customary law and to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights when developing customary law". 18 The corollary to this dual obligation implies that the Court must confront any potential tension between customary law and the principles underlying the Constitution.
Since its inception, the South African Constitutional Court had been a steadfast defender of constitutional rights and values. 19 At the same time, in line with constitutional guarantees, it blazed a trail in the recognition of customary law as an independent source of law. Thus, when applying it, the Court has affirmed the constitutional status of customary law, which "acknowledges the originality and distinctiveness" of customary law, and the fact that it "must be understood in its own terms and not through the lens of the common law". 20 It is therefore not surprising that in Mayelane the Court determines that a process of ascertaining the customary marriage law of the Vatsonga is necessary. 21 In this, it L LEWIS PER / PELJ 2015 (18)4 1130 (untypically) becomes the court of first and last instance by directing that further representations be submitted to determine the content of the law, in order to establish whether the marriage between Mr Moyane and Ms Ngwenyama was valid under customary law. 22 This approach is thus in direct contrast to those adopted in the High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal, where the validity of the marriage -in terms of customary law -was not considered. 23 Yet, in the same breath as vindicating customary law, the Constitutional Court, here and as it had done in other cases, consistently emphasises the fact that such law is subject to the Constitution and must be interpreted accordingly. 24 In Mayelane the Court therefore anticipates a situation of normative plurality that must be resolved, which is not an easy task. That being said, in a number of other cases the Court had opted for the relatively straightforward solution of choosing one set of norms over another, without attempting to resolve any fundamental conflict between them. Such an approach was followed, for example, in Bhe, where the Court invalidated certain rules of the customary law of succession which discriminated against women, and replaced them with existing statutory provisions. 25 In Mayelane, on the other hand, the justices who concur in the main judgment are keenly aware that the Constitution also advances another jurisprudential approach, namely that of "developing" customary law in harmony with constitutional principles. 26 22 Mayelane paras 48, 53. In s 39(2) the Constitution provides that "when developing … customary law, every court … must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights".
3
The "development" of customary law and the need for "translation"
and contextualisation
The Court is of the opinion that, while it "must accord customary law the respect it deserves", it must likewise not "shy away from [its] obligation to develop it in accordance with the normative framework of the Constitution". 27 It must be clear that the "development" of customary law (and presumably most other laws) does not mean that the agent, or court, simply chooses between two sets of norms and then replaces one with the other. Rather, as the Court states, the development of customary law implies a "process" that takes "the traditions of the community concerned" into consideration. 28 In casu, such a process signifies to the Court that it must first ascertain the content of the relevant customary law, and then determine whether and to what degree it diverges from constitutional norms and values, in order to "develop" it to be congruent with the latter. 29 This type of approach followed by the Court, namely judging a matter with reference to an external, official standard, fits the description of "top down" adjudication, which, as explained below, could thwart the development process in fundamental ways. 30 Alternatively, the Court could engage in a different enquiry by adopting a "bottom up"
and "holistic" perspective of the customary order, which would focus to a much greater degree on the customary context and its relevant audience. 31 Such an approach would oblige the Court to "translate" constitutional principles to have meaning and relevance in that particular recipient context. 32 I maintain that this approach is of utmost importance in cases where the Court is intent on "developing" customary law.
27
Mayelane para 71.
28
Mayelane para 45 with reference to Shilubana v Nwamitwa 2009 2 SA 66 (CC).
29
Mayelane paras 69-71, 75-79, 89. 30 See, for example, Twining Globalisation and Legal Theory [130] [131] [132] [133] [134] 253 , on the different stances that can be adopted by those, such as judges, who "participate" in legal processes. Among others, their points of view could be "top-down" or "bottom-up", "internal" or "external", or "detached".
31
Twining Globalisation and Legal Theory 130-134, 253; Kruuse and Sloth-Nielsen 2014 PER 1731. 32 Viewed the other way around, customary concepts such as ubuntu might also have to be "translated" or adapted to a certain extent when used within a "foreign", constitutional context. "language" into which it is translated -but this is not all that is required.
While translators must obviously have a degree of knowledge of the recipient audience and context, they also have to give sufficient consideration to the language and background of the source, otherwise the "story", when translated, will be unintelligible. To complete the loop of the translation in Mayelane, it is therefore important first to ask from which script the constitutional principles come, and what is meant by "dignity" and "equality" in the constitutional sense. 35 Only after establishing these details can the judge translate the essence of the original narrative and make it accessible to a new audience. Both sides of the account must be rendered before the Court will be able to "develop" customary law in a meaningful way and according to the "spirit, purport and objectives" of the Constitution.
Translation, in the manner described above, is consequently closely allied to and presupposes a process of "contextualisation", a term which refers to the adaptation of world to another is at stake: if the intended recipients of certain norms do not view them as legitimate, those norms will lack bindingness in the particular context, and the audience will simply not "hear" them. 50 While it is all very well for judges (and writers) to call attention to the importance of "context", the proper translation from one normative language into another "necessarily involves art and invention". 51 This is due to the polycentric structure of normative systems, each having "its own macro-context, the social and physical environment in which it is to operate". 52 Determining the content of and the interplay between the relevant contexts therefore becomes central to making constitutional values accessible.
It follows that, when judges contextualise constitutional values within a customary law framework, they cannot rely exclusively on perceived similarities. 53 Above all, they have to be conscious of the normative and cultural differences between the constitutional and the customary orders. 54 Without clearly identifying and understanding these differences, it is difficult to fathom how a court will be able to "develop" customary (or any other) legal system. 55 Hence, a "deliberative process" is required wherein judges engage fully with the content of customary law. 56 And as
50
Teubner 1998 MLR 18, on "law's binding arrangements", which are "selective" because "law is intricately interwoven with culture". Compare Dan-Cohen Harmful Thoughts 44, who develops the concept of "acoustic separation", that is, a situation wherein, "certain normative messages are more likely to register with one of the [relevant] groups" than another, which again points to the need to particularise such "messages". (18)4 1136 noted, such deliberation must therefore take cognisance of "the material conditions that shape people's lives". 57
The difficulty with respect to the contextual approach is, of course, that of establishing the content of the relevant context(s), a problem that is exacerbated in the case of an uncodified, "living" system such as customary law. 58 In addition, it must be remembered that all cultures and contexts are permeable and fluid. 59 In the same way that languages change over time, contexts change, and judges have to consider the currency of the normative "language" they use. They cannot, for example, rely on an archaic version that the audience will find unintelligible. In terms of customary law, this means that courts -as the Court sought to do in Mayelane -must apply the "living" customary law and not an official, essentialised, and potentially outdated, As previously noted, in its determination of the matter, the Constitutional Court rejects positivistic reliance on section 7(6) of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act.
With reference to the resolution of the present matter, it sets out to vindicate the important role of customary law as a "primary" source of law. 62 In so doing, the Court relies on the requirements in section 3(1)(b) of the Act for the validity of a customary marriage, which determine that it "must be negotiated and entered into or celebrated in accordance with customary law". For these and other reasons the Court concludes that the relevance of the customary law regarding the consent of the first wife did not depend on whether it was raised in cross-appeal in the court a quo. 63 Hence, of its own accord the Court pursues the question of the content of the relevant customary law. 64 Moreover, the Court is mindful of the fact that "customary law" means the "living"
law. 65 The Court acknowledges the difficulty of ascertaining such living law and of meeting the apparently contradictory requirements for the application of customary law, namely flexibility and certainty. 66 In order to fulfil its obligations, the Court calls for the submission of further evidence to ascertain the content of the law. 67 The submissions thus produced are not uniform. 68 The Court is nevertheless unperturbed by the numerous discrepancies, which it describes as "nuances and perspectives that are often missed or ignored when viewed from a common-law perspective". 69 After studying the evidence, the court concludes that:
... customary law must be developed, to the extent that it does not yet do so, to include a requirement that the consent of the first wife is necessary for the validity of a subsequent customary marriage.
70
While the Court takes seriously its mandate to develop customary law, can it do this in a vacuum, and does it manage to tap into the "richness" of its underlying values?
Dignity and equality -untranslated
Central to the argument in the High Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court is the need to ensure the equality and dignity of women in the course of promoting the spirit of the Constitution. 71 It is remarkable, however, that the justices do not analyse these concepts in detail, and describe only in broad terms what various judicial interpretations of dignity and equality are. In the Supreme Court this is done predominantly with reference to Constitutional Court jurisprudence. For example, quoting from Gumede the court determines that the "Recognition Act is inspired by the dignity and equality rights that the Constitution entrenches and the normative value systems it establishes". 72 This approach, which simultaneously relies on and reinforces the idea that dignity and equality must be construed in terms of the Constitution, thus situates the meaning of these values within that particular context.
As seen above, however, the constitutional context is neither neutral nor universal.
Instead, it is "tightly coupled" to the international human rights law paradigm, which instantiates a particular rights script based on (liberal) individualism. 73 The court 69 Mayelane para 60. Zondo J, at para 123, however, is of the opinion that "there are clear contradictions" between the various affidavits. Conversely, after stringent examination of the evidence Jafta J, at para 138, in a further separate judgment, is of the view that the "evidence supporting the applicant … is overwhelming". This, in spite of the Court's view that courts must "be careful not to impose common-law or other understandings of that concept" (such as "consent"), and "also not assume that such a notion as 'consent' will have a universal meaning". Mayelane para 49.
As the present matter shows, dignity and equality are difficult to describe in nonrelational terms. Hence, the result is that there are competing arguments in the range of judgments about whose dignity is at stake. In the High Court the dignity of the first wife is paramount. 79 In the Supreme Court of Appeal the dignity and equality of the second wife vis-à-vis the first become the focus. In the Constitutional Court, albeit on separate grounds, the dignity and equality of the first wife are central to judgment. 80 The overall effect is one of disjuncture in the approaches adopted by the different courts, as well as in the conclusions reached by them -resulting in a plethora of unintended consequences. 81 Similarly, although not dissenting, the separate judgments in the Constitutional Court are in fundamental ways at variance with the reasoning in the main judgment. 82 It appears as though the actual audience has been forgotten in these renditions of the dignity-and-equality script.
The customary law context
In line with its existing jurisprudence, the Constitutional Court in Mayelane presents itself as a steadfast champion of customary law, at the same time it also displays certain ideological preferences.
As described above, the Court orientates itself according to the liberal, individualistic ideology upon which the human rights regime is founded, one that tends to trivialise the relationship between the individual and his or her community. Customary law, on the other hand, is overtly group centred, and ideologically aligns itself to the notion of the "duty of individuals to find their place in the order of the entire society". Nevertheless, in the process of ascertaining the content of the customary law of the Vatsonga, the Court does not reflect on the position of the family in the matter, despite the fact that it has a definite and direct bearing on the validity of the second marriage. 88 Instead, the Court's approach, by reproducing the individualistic substructure of the Act, strongly endorses international rights law and in its wake the "egotism" of western "social atomism". 89
For the simple reason that customary law configures rights from a different perspective, the Court cannot facilely transpose mainstream ideas about dignity and equality onto the customary system. As it appears from the evidence in Mayelane, the status and dignity of a wife in a customary marriage is to a large extent contingent on the views and participation of the family. Thus, for example, "the second woman will be regarded as a concubine if the husband's relatives do not support the husband". 90
84
Mayelane para 29 and compare with para 24, where the importance of "communitarian traditions" and their link to the "unity of family structures" is highlighted (my emphasis); and see for example, Bennett Customary Law 188, 199. 85 Mayelane paras 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 105. 86 Mayelane para 56.
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Compare Kruuse and Sloth-Nielsen 2014 PER 1722, who make the point that, by contrast, the first wife's consent to a second marriage may amount to a "courtesy call … at best".
88
Note again the references in note 84 above. Furthermore, with reference to the evidence, if the role of the family had been taken into account it would have been relatively easy to establish that on the face of it no valid customary marriage had been concluded. See, however, Mabena v Letsoalo 1998 2 SA 1068 (T) and the discussion in part 5.1 below. If this is so, a judicial pronouncement on what constitutes her dignity could in fact be quite meaningless. In the context of a wife's lived reality, it appears that lack of recognition by the family will most certainly affect her status, and consequently her sense of dignity and equality within the community. 91 The point is that the deep-seated gender identity and social structures, as reflected in the customary system, cannot hastily be rewritten in a judgment, since they are most resistant to change. 92 They are furthermore linked to values, such as dignity, which are particularly context-specific. 93 The vindication of rights is without a doubt a primary consideration that animates the judgment in Mayelane. Yet it must be remembered that "[p]art of the reason for the failure … to respect human rights lies in the seemingly alien character of that corpus". 94 Every South African court, which takes seriously its dual mandate to promote on one hand the values underlying the Bill of Rights, and on the other to recognise and develop customary law, is therefore obliged to particularise those values in such a way that they will resonate with the given customary context in order to be accepted by participants.
Nevertheless, in all three courts there had not been any translation of the concepts dignity and equality from the mainstream script to that of the customary. 95 The result of the failure of the courts to establish a link between these values and their relevant context is evident in the abovementioned tangle of divergent judgments, wherein the 91 Mayelane paras 55, 56.
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Teubner's analysis of "tight and loose coupling" of norms to their social context is again helpful. He explains that "the resistance to change is high when law is tightly coupled in binding arrangements to other social processes". Teubner 1998 MLR 19. Also see Menski "Monsters" 452-453, on the importance of "culture" as a "grounded reality" that legal systems "cannot afford to ignore"; and (quoting Himonga) as not being "a superficial thing that people put on and off like shoes".
93
Thus, it has been argued by Legrand that it is "impossible" to "transplant" a legal norm or phenomenon from one socio-cultural context to another, since the meaning with which it is invested is "culture-specific" and therefore "never displaced because it always refers to an idiosyncratic semio-cultural situation". Legrand 1997 
Two scripts: implications and the role of the Court
According to the analysis above, there are at least two different ways of construing the dignity and equality of wives in customary marriages. As will be explained below, their boundaries are not necessarily watertight, yet in broad strokes one construction is rooted in the liberal, individualistic ideology of the international and constitutional rights regime, while the other emphasises communalism and the importance of the extended family. 97
In Mayelane, the abundant evidence about the part played by the family in validating the existence of a customary marriage is not taken into consideration. Although it has gone to great lengths to hear evidence in order to "ascertain" the applicable customary law, the Court is narrowly concerned with whether or not the consent of the first wife is necessary for the validity of the marriage, when other customary norms clearly also have a bearing on its legality. 98 In its defence, however, it could perhaps be argued that the Court was correct in limiting its enquiry to the consent question, since it was pleaded in the High Court by Ms Mayelane, while other customary rules and requirements were merely alluded to. 99 As it is, the Court had taken a bold step in deciding the consent issue, which had not been raised in cross-appeal in the Supreme Court of Appeal, as well as by its ascertainment of the living customary law, and its subsequent development thereof. 100 96 See parts 3.3 and 3.4 above. This is perhaps also the reason why the development of customary law undertaken by the Constitutional Court produces a discrepant result if more than two wives are involved, since the Court requires only the first wife's consent. See in particular the separate judgment of Jafta J at para 153. It is incumbent on our courts to take steps to satisfy themselves as to the content of customary law and, where necessary to evaluate local custom in order to ascertain the content of the relevant legal rule.
102
This reasoning corresponds to the analysis in Shilubana, 103 to which the Court refers with approval, namely that the "process" of determination must be informed, inter alia, by a "consideration of the traditions of the community concerned". 104 In addition, the Court makes frequent reference to "living" customary law as a "system", which implies that its rules do not operate in isolation. 105 It also recognises the fact that customary law may "impose validity requirements in addition to those set out in [the Act]". 106
By focusing only on the consent of the first wife, the Court neglects these additional validity requirements, notably those relating to the family. They are overlooked, despite being linked by the Court itself to the fact that "in pre-colonial times, 'marriage was always a bond between families and not between individual spouses'", and that
presently the values of customary law:
... provide a setting which contributes to the unity of family structures and the fostering of co-operation, a sense of responsibility and belonging in its members, as well as nurturing communitarian traditions like ubuntu.
107
It can be inferred that the approach actually followed by the Court is the result of its preoccupation with individual rights and autonomy described above. It must therefore also be an approach that will skew the "ascertainment" of customary law and thus its proposed development, which presumably depends on the proper acknowledgement (18)4 1145 of its content. Furthermore, the Court does not follow its own logic, which prescribes that it must determine the "living content" of customary law and not only selected portions thereof. 108 Equally, the Court cautions that customary law must not be viewed "through the prism of legal conceptions foreign to it", and must be treated with the "deference and dignity it deserves". 109 Yet, the Court side-steps these very requirements and therefore fails to translate and contextualise dignity and equality appropriately.
Should the Court translate constitutional values at all?
The tough task the Court has set itself of ascertaining and developing the living customary law is further complicated by the overriding requirement that such law must reflect "the rights and values of the Constitution from which it draws its legal force". 110
The question is therefore whether the group-orientated underpinnings of dignity and equality in the customary system are in any way compatible with their construal in the constitutional context. protect the dignity and equality of women by means of the development of customary law, it is necessary however that they discern clearly whether the script upon which its ascertainment relies is not a contested version that merely favours and reinforces oppressive power structures. 115 One could therefore ask whether these apparent obstacles are reason enough to obviate the operation of certain customary values within a framework of transformational jurisprudence. is unclear that liberalism and communitarianism necessarily conflict". It is, according to them, a "false dichotomy". 117
Inherent tensions in the context
Santos 118 goes further, saying that "rather than cannibalizing each other", individual and collective rights can in fact "strengthen each other". Thus, he propounds a "virtuous hybridization among the most comprehensive and emancipatory conceptions of human dignity" found in both the "human rights tradition" and in "other traditions". 119
The idea that individual rights and communalism interlock makes good sense.
Although under the Constitution we are predominantly individual right bearers, we are nevertheless, as recognised by the Court, "not islands unto ourselves". 120 This proposition is, after all, also implicit in the Court's claim of simultaneously vindicating constitutional values and customary law, which claim in theory embraces both positions. Such a dual mandate would be impossible if these systems were utterly oppositional. 121 It was thus incumbent upon the Court to take due notice of the customary context, and not to entrench the "false dichotomy" between the constitutional and customary value systems. It is thus argued that the role of the family in the customary law of marriage should have been brought to bear on the validity of the marriage as a matter of customary law and, most importantly, in relation to the development of customary law in construing the dignity of both wives. This contention, however, immediately raises those prickly, age-old questions about discrimination so often associated with customary law and its patriarchal power structures. 122 Dignity cannot easily be severed from a person's self-understanding and identity, which are in many respects "socially constructed". 123 In reality, human beings do not have a single, monolithic identity, but several individual and collective identities, which continuously overlap. 124 Because these identities are embedded in their relevant sociocultural contexts, and because people move between them, both identities and contexts are not "bounded", but are fluid and dynamic. 125 Thus, the individualismversus-communalism debate is not about binary opposites but about degrees of emphasis. Both types of identity are important and both matter to people to varying degrees, depending on the given context. 126
Contextual scripts of dignity and identity
Therefore, one could not say that bringing the family into matrimonial affairs or even making the validity of a marriage dependent on the participation of the family is in itself an outright affront to a wife's dignity. From an "internal" perspective, much will depend on the importance that the wife attaches to her group identity and the value she attaches to her status within and solidarity with the community, and further, how "western" and "indigenous" values reflects a "bounded view of culture", which, inter alia, ignores its contestation within communities. Also note the reference at 177, to Mabena v Letsoalo 1998 2 SA 1068 (T) para C, 1073, which illustrates how people move between civil and customary systems, and how the customary context can change to accommodate new realities.
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Appiah Ethics of Identity 20, 23. 127 Compare Dan-Cohen Harmful Thoughts 164, on the "social meaning" associated with the dignity of women, which can be "assessed only in terms that are internal to the particular cultures concerned".
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Dan-Cohen Harmful Thoughts 164, who gives the example of wife beating, which is such a firmly entrenched and accepted cultural practice in some communities that it gives rise to the so-called "cultural defence". collective identities. 129 Thus, the issue of identity is relevant to the apparent "dichotomy" between the constitutional and customary worldviews pertaining to Mayelane.
If the Court therefore wants to instil the necessary respect for customary law, it must fully address -and not ignore -the power of the family (or the community) to dictate in certain matrimonial matters, while ensuring that this fact does not infringe the dignity of women in relation to both their individual and their collective identities. De
Sousa Santos 130 provides helpful insights into the tensions between cultures based predominantly on individualism on the one hand, and communalism on the other by explaining that all cultures are "reciprocally incomplete". Thus, (the culture) of human rights, which focusses on "derivative" rights, "rather than on … the duty of individuals to find their place in the order of the entire society", is incomplete. 131 Conversely, a system that has a:
... strong undialectical bias in favour of harmony … neglects the fact that, without primordial [fundamental] rights, the individual is too fragile an entity to avoid being run over by whatever transcends him or her.
132
De Sousa Santos's thesis thus provides another reason why the Court erred in
Mayelane by neglecting the communitarian customary context. This is because it traded one incomplete regime for another, when a more meaningful "completion" of rights could be achieved by considering "the most comprehensive and emancipatory conceptions of human dignity" found in both systems. 133
The Court as "virtuous" translator
Elevating one context and the value system it represents over another thwarts the idea of creating a "virtuous hybridization" between different constructions of dignity. 134 In Mayelane this approach meant that the Court reduced both the customary and constitutional contexts to "bounded" entities, thereby missing an opportunity to investigate how dignity is shaped by the porosity and coalescence of the individual and collective identities of women as respectively mirrored by these systems. 135 Yet it is vital that the Court "unbinds" and links these contexts.
Returning to the original metaphor and previous sections, the Court as translator of norms and values must take the contexts of both the original script and of the translation into account. If this process is successfully carried out, the narrative in the former will retain its integrity, yet it will be sufficiently particularised to make sense in a new context. The result will be a "virtuous" hybridisation or translation, wherein the original message is not lost nor rejected by the listeners, because they will understand its meaning relative to their own realities. 136 A perplexing question is clearly that of how any court can accomplish the task of integrating different values. Although the details of the problem fall squarely within the domain of courts themselves, a few tentative observations can be made.
The first is that courts regularly wrestle with conflicting norms and values, their meaning and construction -no matter where they originate. 137 The resolution of competing interests animates constitutional and transformational jurisprudence, and it is something that the South African Constitutional Court is particularly adept at doing. As reflected in many of its judgments, the Court by carefully weighing different interests has been able to challenge and reject an array of oppressive and discriminatory norms. Hence, the jurisprudential logic found in Makwanyane for example, which allowed the Court to mediate between greatly divergent exigencies and thereby find the "golden thread" in constitutional and customary value systems, This logic goes hand-in-hand with the methodology adopted by the Court, which relies on a number of important jurisprudential "tools", notably those of balancing and proportionality. 139 The associated principles, which are concerned with determining the relative or proportional weight of competing interests, are particularly useful for the resolution of conflict between norms. 140 They can similarly be applied in the balancing of potentially conflicting regimes, or even the Court's own competing mandates, such as those represented in Mayelane. These tools are also highly compatible with, and indeed, presuppose the processes of contextualisation and translation described above. 141
Translating and contextualising the constitutional dignity script would, as explained above, require the Court to take seriously the place of the family, and if necessary that of the community, in the construal of a wife's dignity and equality. However, what it does not mean is that that factor should be afforded disproportionate weight.
Instead, balancing and proportionality means that a court, in this situation, will consider dignity and equality from both an individual and a collective perspective and evaluate each one within the framework of its mandate. This exercise is not one that relies on monocultural preferences.
Elements of the proportionality test are described by Albertyn 142 in what is called the "Harksen test". According to her, the test:
... entails a contextual assessment of the impact of an impugned rule or conduct with due regard to the degree of disadvantage suffered by the complainant and his or her group, the purpose of the act/conduct and the extent to which the complainant's rights and interests are invaded. These factors are weighed up within an overall assessment of the impairment of human dignity, generally defined as a failure to be treated with equal concern and respect. 
Conclusion
By analogy with Mabena, the Court may well have concluded -after a "deliberative"
proportionality enquiry -that allowing the family to have the power to determine the validity of a marriage will allow it to have too much power over the destiny of the women concerned. Or it may find that on balance a woman's individual identity and rights in a particular instance outweigh those that are construed collectively. There is, however, a salient difference between this scenario and the one in Mayelane where the Court neglected such inquiry altogether.
Had it been more conscious of the customary context, the Court would have Furthermore, each of these systems is embedded in its own socio-cultural context, and therefore the liberal individualism of international law could be "foreign" in a customary context, which values communalism. Hence, it is asked whether courts can accommodate pluralism by simply transposing norms and values such as dignity and equality from one system to another, particularly in cases where the court sets out to "develop" customary law. It is argued that norms and values have to be interpreted and applied with reference to their particular context and audience.
Thus, there is a need for courts to contextualise and attune, or "translate" norms, whenever they are applied to another system. 
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